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CALLISTUS'S CASE
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF ROMAN BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
By
WILLEM J. ZWALVE
Introduction
Sometime in 222 a certain Callistus consulted the young emperor
Alexander Severus about his legal position. He had contracted with a slave
and wanted to sue the owner. The owner contended that his liability was
limited to the amount of the working capital, peculium, at the disposal of his
slave. Callistus wanted to know if, and - if so - on what ground, hè could
sue the owner for the surplus.' His question goes to the heart of what we now
know as 'business law'; it touches upon the question of limited liability and
business law, as we know it, is all about limited liability. Yet Roman law had
to do without the legal devices that modern law has come up with in order to
achieve that end. There was, in fact, nothing even remotely resembling
modern Company law in the law of Rome.2 But there were devices serving
the same needs as modern Company law purports to do.
In order to understand the scope of this assessment, it is worth while to
draw attention to the origin of modern Company law. As every lawyer
knows, it is a fairly recent development and, unlike most of modern
continental-European commercial law, it was not inspired by the law of
Rome. Modern company-law originated in Amsterdam, where, in 1602, the
Dutch East India Company, the first joint-stock Company in the history of
law, was patented. As I see it, there were three motives resulting in the
development ofthat legal device:
• limiting the liability of the directors of the Company,
• limiting the liability of the participants in the company,
• raising capital, otherwise not available on the capital market.
The Dutch East India Company was established primarily because of a
relative shortness of supply of venture capital on the market. Very few banks
and individual entrepreneurs in the Netherlands were prepared to risk the
Investment of the enormous sums of rnoney involved at such uncertain odds.
It is here that we touch upon an important difference between the Roman
1
 C J 4 25 2 (Alexander), for the text see n 48 mfra
2
 M I Fmley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley 1973),
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economy and the Dutch economy of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
Century. It is the difference between what has been called the first modern
economy3 and an economy that was all but modern. Take, for example, the
capital market. There was no such thing in Rome. There was a money
market, but no capital market in the modern sense of that concept.
Raising capital
One of the first things that strike a modern lawyer as rather odd when
contemplating the broader aspects of the Roman credit system as handed
down to us in Justinian's Corpus luris Civilis, is the fact that credit in-
stitutions, financing companies and banks, are practically absent from the
scène. True as it may be that there are indeed (a few) references to num-
mularn, tabularü and argentarii, they seem to have lost their way in a world
that was largely dominated by other players. This impression is confirmed by
some of the very good work that has been done recently on the history of
Roman banking, such as Jean Andreau's important book on Roman financial
institutions4 and Christopher Howgego's inspiring article on the supply and
use of money in the Roman world.5 Both scholars emphasise that Roman
'bankers' merely offered short-term credit for a particular kind of
transactions (especially auctions) to a fairly modest public. The elite,
senators and equites, did not 'bank with the bankers'. Long term credit for
large amounts of money seems to have been above the means of Roman
'bankers'. It was only to be had from private individuals, from enterprising
equites and senators. They must have had enormous hoards at their disposal,
more often than not stashed in temples and horrei.
Howgego has stressed the importance of the velocity of circulation
of money for the working of a monetary economy. He is right, but
one should be very much aware of the fact that in Rome money
circulated at a pace much slower than we are accustomed to. One
should not be too impressed by a 'monetary' economy that had no
need for cheques and bills of exchange.6 We know Assyrian traders
3
 J. de Vries & A. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy (Cambridge 1997).
4
 La vie financiers dans Ie monde Romain (les métiers de manieurs d'argent) (Rome 1987). See also
his Banking and Business in the Roman World (Cambridge 1999) and A.Bürge, 'Fiktion und
Wirklichkeit: soziale und rechtliche Strukturen des römischen Bankwesens' in Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiflungfür Rechtsgeschichte (ZSS) 104 (1987), 465 ff.
5
 Journal of Roman Studies 82 (1992), 1-31.
6
 This point is also stressed by Fr. de Martino, Wirtschaftsgeschichte des alten Rom (Munich 1991),
365.
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used those, relatively simple, legal devices almost a thousand years
before the apogee of the Roman economy. The fact that they were
unknown to Roman law should have some meaning in determining
questions relating to the use of money in the Roman empire. Roman
law was unable to think of money in other terms than 'real money',
that is ready cash as opposed to e.g. the right to receive cash. This
inability reflects a pre-capitalistic, if indeed not a rather primitive
state of mind that makes the use of the term 'monetary economy' in
a description of the Roman economy very misleading.
The Roman upper classes of the Principate, senators and equites, have been
criticised for not investing their huge fortunes in trade and industry by
spending it on luxury goods and the acquisition of land7, but they may not
have been as irresponsible as is suggested.
'Quaestus omnis patribus indecorus', says Livy.8 This attitude, as well
as the well-known prohibition on owning ships9, seems to have left senators
with few other opportunities than aggrandising their already considerable
holdings in real estate10 and, indeed, the supply of monetary credit. Not
taking into account the populär fenus nauücum, exempted from the 12%
ceiling on interest rates11, the latter was not attractive. It has been established
that in the first Century A.D. an Investment in Italian vineyards secured an
average profit of 7-10%12, whereas the average return on a well-secured long
term loan was 4—6%13 and in the age of the Antonines even as low as 3-
5%.14 No wonder therefore that the younger Pliny had invested practically all
7
 A H M Jones, The Roman Economy (ed by P A Brunt, Oxford 1974), 124
8
 21 63 4
9
 Dig 50 5 3 (Scaevola)
10
 A M Andermahr, Totus in praedus (senatorischer Grundbesitz in Italien m der frühen und hohen
Kaiserzeit) (Bonn 1998), l 'Ein derartiges Wirtschatsgebaren - Festlegung nahezu des gesamten
Vermögens in Grundbesitz bei gleichzeitigem Mangel an flüssigen Geldmitteln - war freilich keine
wunderliche Eigenart des Plinius, sondern dürfte für Angehörige der römischen Oberschicht typisch
gewesen sein'
" The centesimae usurae was fixed at a maximum of 12 %per annum since the end of the Repubhc
until it was changed by Justiman m 528 Paulus, Sententiae 1 14 2-4, C Th 2 33 2 and C J 4 32 26 2
See for the ongm of the centesimae usurae M Käser, Das romische Privatrecht I (Mumch 1971), 497
(with further literature) On the exceptional position of the fenus nauticum see C J 4332
(Diocletianus)
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 R Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge 1974), 59
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 G Billeter, Geschichte des Zmsfusses im griechisch-romischen Altertum bis auf Justiman (Leipzig
1898), 180
14
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his money in real estate and only a little in bonds.15 There was no market
where venture capital was put at the disposal of business enterprises:
'apparently no influential men were interested in industry'16, whereas the
necessary funds were never at the disposal of the all but influential Roman
argentarn. Consequently, Roman industry never developed into great
concerns: there was no capital available for such enterprises. But, one would
venture to observe, neither was there in the Netherlands in the sixteenth
Century and so Dutch entrepreneurs and their legal council invented the
joint-stock company as a means of raising capital. So why did Roman
lawyers fail to contrive a financing device like that?
A Roman partnership, societas, is not a legal arrangement suited to serve as
a financing mechanism.17 A societas was (and is) contracted between
partners having in mind the specific qualities of each one of them. It was
(and is) essentially a contract obliging the partners to co-operate for a
specific purpose, mostly (not always) the pursuit of profit. The emphasis was
(and is) on collaboration, rather than contribution. Consequently, the relation
between the contracting parties was (and is) of a highly personal nature.
Death and bankruptcy of, as well as unilateral renunciation by one of the
partners terminated the partnership.18 Of course, a partner was also unable to
transfer his share in the partnership to a third party.19 The latter aspect is
important. A share in a modern joint stock company is, as a rule, an
assignable property right. The assignability of bonds and equities is the most
essential element of modern company law and of the modern economy as
such: the stock exchange, where equities are sold and transferred all over the
world every minute of the day, is the symbol of our modern economy. As we
have just seen, Roman law did not provide for the assignability of a
partnership in a societas and neither did it acknowledge the assignability of a
common bond.20 True as it may be that an ingenuous device (powers of
15
 Epistulae 3.19.8: 'Sum quidem prope totus in praediis, aliquid tarnen fenero, nee molestum erit
mutuari'.
16
 M. Rostovlzeff, The Social and Economie History of the Roman Empire (Oxford 1927), 165.
17
 This point is also stressed by R. W. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems (Cambridge 1987), 36.
18
 See Käser, op.cit. (n. 11) I, 575. In all cases the partnership was also dissolved as far as the
remaining partners were concerned. When they decided to continue the partnership, it was regarded as
a new societas. See Käser, I.e. and R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (Cape Town 1990), 455-
456.
19
 The only thing a partner could do was to share his share in a new (sub-) partnership with an outsider.
In such a case there was no relation between that third party and the partners of his partner on account
of the maxim 'socii mei socius meus socius non est' (Dig. 17.2.20 [Ulp.]).
20
 Gaius, Institutiones 2.38 and Dig. 41.1.43.1 (Gaius).
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attorney) was conceived in order to circumvent the rule against alienability
of choses in action, the doctrine of assignment of choses in action was never
as central to Roman commercial law as it is in modern law.21 I believe all
this largely accounts for the absence of a genuine capital market in the
Roman econo-my. In early modern history, and certainly in the Netherlands
at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth Century, choses in action were
assignable as a matter of course.22 Consequently, bills of exchange, bonds
and shares in the East India Company were freely traded in another
Institution of fairly recent origin, the Amsterdam Exchange, the 'Beurs', and
the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, established in 1609. Since then - after, that
is, the rise of modern capitalism - our perception of what an 'economy' is
has fundamentally changed. The Roman 'economy' was different, not the
least on account of the structural mobilisation of slave labour in all levels of
economie activity.
Limiting liabilities
Whenever Roman capitalists wanted to engage in entrepreneurial activities
without incurring füll liability, they could - and would - use their slaves. I
am convinced that senators and equites rarely — if ever — engaged in
activities of this kind without deploying slaves. No senator or distinguished
eques would demean himself to personally venture into this kind of
activities, nor were they inclined to advance money to that end to outsiders,
but they were keen to exploit the talents of their slaves and to invest money
into their enterprises. In doing so, they avoided liabilities they would have
incurred if they had entered into this kind of business themselves and gained
considerably higher profits on their investment than would have been gained
by giving credit to outsiders. In order to understand the füll impact of these
assessments, it is necessary to emphasise a basic rule of the Roman law of
slavery.
As a matter of course, a slave-owner is never liable for his slave's
contracts. 3 A slave has no legal capacity and consequently hè cannot engage
in legal activities on his own right.24 His contracts do, however, bind his
master if hè has acted on authority (iusswri) to engage in a contract on behalf
21
 On the development of the doctrine of assignment of choses m action see R Zimmermann, op cit
(n 18), 60 ff (with further literature)
22
 On this see H Coing, Europaisches Privatrecht I (Älteres gemeines Recht) (Munich 1985), 445 ff
23
 Masters were only iiable for damages caused by tortuous conduct of their slaves, on the same basis
as their liability for damages caused by animals in their potestas See Käser, op cit (n 11) l, 163 ff
24
 Gaius, Institutiones 3 104
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of his master.25 In this case, the master is fully (in solidum) liable for his
slave's engagements:
'merito ex iussu domini in solidum adversus eum iudicium datur,
nam quodammodo cum eo contrahitur qui iubet'.2
There was a way to avoid in solidum liability for the engagements of a slave
acting on behalf of his master. Whenever a master had provided his slave
with a working capital (peculium) in order to enable the latter to pursue an
enterprise, the liability of the master for the engagements of his slave was
limited to the amount advanced to the latter. In granting a peculium, the
master raised the status of his slave considerably. The slave cum peculio was
not a free man, but hè had ceased to be a mere commodity in the eyes of the
law, for in assessing the scope of the peculium, the law took notice of
'liabilities' of the master to his slave and vice versa.
The factual Separation of the estate of the master and the 'equitable' estate of
the slave cum peculio became apparent at the latter's bankruptcy. In order to
establish the assets available for distribution among the creditors, all the
liabilities of the slave to his master had to be deduced from the peculium^
Consequently, the master was a de facto preferential creditor in his own
slave's bankruptcy. The rule onparitas creditorum did not apply in the case
of a bankrupt peculium, so Gaius's maxim 'in actione de peculio occupantis
melior est condicio'29 implied that there was usually very little left after the
master had been satisfied.
Though formally and technically still a part of the estate of the master,
in fact and even at law the peculium had become a special rund separated
from the rest of the estate of the master. In doing so, the law had created a
25
 Gaius 4.70.
26
 Dig. 15.4.1 pr. (Ulpianus, libro vicensimo nono ad edictum). According to A. Kirschenbaum, Sons,
slaves andfreedman in Roman commerce (Jerusalem 1987), the fact that many business-men were in
fact slaves largely explains why Roman law failed to develop a 'law of agency'. There was no
urgency, because more often than not a principal could be sued on account of a iussum to his slave .
27
 On peculium generally see A. Kirschenbaum, op.cit. (n. 26); J.J. Brinkhof, Een studie over het
peculium in het klassieke Romeinse recht (Meppel 1978), containing a resumé in German, and I.
Zeber, A study of the peculium of a slave in pre-classical and classical Roman law (Wroclaw 1981).
28
 Gaius 4.73 and Tubero's defmition in Dig. 15.1.5.4 (Ulpianus): 'peculium autem Tubero quidem sic
defmit, ut Celsus libro sexto digestorum refert, quod servus domini permissu separatum a rationibus
dominicis habet, deducto inde si quid domino debetur'.
29
 Dig. 15.1.10.
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new person, albeit a fictitious person. The Roman lawyers were aware of
this: peculium simile homini, says Papirius Fronto.30 It is not unlike a
modern corporation, which is also essentially a complex of property rights
and liabilities treated by the law as a person capable of participating in
commercial activities. The analogy with modern Company law goes even
further than that, for it should be stressed that it was the peculium mat was
treated as a separate legal identity, not the slave acting on behalf of it. In
other words, the peculium, not the slave cum peculio, was the bearer of
property rights and responsibilities. So the slave was not liable at all,
whereas his master was merely liable on account of the fact that it was only
through him, as the legal representative of the peculium, that a creditor could
lay his hands on it. In this way Roman law met the same needs as those
underlying modern Company law, where the liability of a shareholder in a
Company is limited to his duty (to the Company) to pay up for his shares in
füll. No wonder, therefore, that many Roman business enterprises - banks,
factories, shops and even schools - were run by slaves acting as grantees of a
peculium.31
It was not unusual, even normal, for a slave to pay for his manumission
out of his peculium.32 The agreement to that end (pactum libertatis)33 was
even actionable on the part of the slave: if his master failed to set him free on
being offered the prize agreed upon, the slave could file a complaint with the
praefectus urbi or the praeses provinciae.34 At first sight, the arrangement
seems rather odd from a legal perspective. A slave could not own property so
the master was paid for the manumission of his slave out of his own pocket.
'Whenever we say that a slave buys his freedom suis nummis', says Ulpian,
'we do so by closing our eyes to the fact that a slave cannot own property',35
But it was not out of the master's estate that the slave paid for his freedom,
but out of his peculium. There was a nice distinction between the grant of a
30
 Dig 15 l 40 (Marcianus) 'Peculium nascitur crescit decrescit morttur, et ideo eleganter Papirius
Fronto dicebat peculium simile esse homini'
31
 Of course, slaves cum peculio were entitled to leave the admmistration of part of their peculium to
slaves that were part of the original peculium (servi vicaru) So a slave could 'own' his own slaves,
thus making his rnaster a genuine 'holding Company' On peculium vicaru see e g Dig 15 l 6, 7 4 and
W Buckland, The Roman Law ofSlavery (Cambridge 1908 (2nd ed , 1970)), 246 ff
32
 M Käser, op cit (n 11), 288, Brinkhof, op cit (n 27),133 ff, Zeber, op cit (n 27), 72,
Kirschenbaum, op cit (n 26), 35 and, of course, Buckland, op cit (n 31), 640 ff
33
 See, for an example, Dig 44 5 2 2 (Paulus) The agreement may not have been actionable in the
Repubhc, but there are frequent references to it in Plautus's plays See, for example, Radens 929 ff
34
 Dig 40 l 5 (Marcianus)
35
 Dig 40 l 4 l
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peculium and the delivery of some money to a slave ad negotiandum?6 By
granting a peculium to his slave, the master had, for all practical purposes,
segregated his own estate from the peculium of his slave. Of course Roman
lawyers were aware of the fact that the concept of a separate 'estate'
belonging to a slave is, at best, rather tortuous. At law (iure civilï), a slave
cannot own things, neither can hè be a creditor or a debtor.37 Nevertheless,
Paul emphasises that in order to establish a separate fund in his estate the
mere will of the master that it should be so was insufficient. There had to be
a genuine transfer of the elements of the peculium to the slave.38 There is a
striking resemblance to the creation of an 'inter vivos trust' in modern
Anglo-American law: in order to establish a peculium, the master had to
transfer certain specified elements of his estate to a slave with the
unequivocal intention to create a peculium. An English or American lawyer
will immediately recognise the 'certainties' of modern 'trust'-law.39
Be this as it may, the creation of the peculium was to the mutual benefit
of master and slave, for as a freedman the latter was allowed to take the
entire peculium or a part of it with him unless it was expressly reserved.40
This accounts for the presence of so many rieh freedmen among the
merchants and shopkeepers of Italy in the age of the Antonines.41 It was a
very profitable Investment for the owner, for all the profits were his, whereas
his liability was limited to the amount of the peculium advanced to his slave.
If hè had invested in monetary credit, hè would have been merely awarded
36
 Dig. 40.7.39.2 (lavolenus).
37
 See Dig. 15.1 41 (Ulpianus, libro quadragensimo tertio ad Sabinum)): 'nee servus quicquam debere
potest nee servo potest deberi, sed cum eo verbo abutimur, factum magis demonstramus quam ad ius
civile referimus Obligationen!, itaque quod servo debetur, ab extraneis dominus recte petet, quod
servus ipse debet, eo nomine in peculium et si quid inde in rem domini versum est in dominum actio
datur'.
38
 Dig. 15.1.8 (Paulus, libro quarto ad Sabinum)'. 'Non statim quod dominus voluit ex re sua peculii
esse, peculium fecit, sed si tradidit aut, cum apud eum esset, pro tradito habuit: desiderat enim res
naturalem dationem'.
39
 Paui's ruling that a genuine transfer of the elements of the peculium was required in order to create a
peculium and that a mere declaration to that purpose was insufficient, has its counterpart in modern
'trust'-law: 'the Court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then
every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust' (Milroy v.
Lord (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264 at 274 (Lord Turner)).
40
 Dig. 15.1.53 (Paulus) and 23.3.39 pr. (Ulpianus). See also Fragmenta Vaticana § 261, where it is
made clear that the rule only held with inter vivos manumissions. It is, therefore, hardly surprising to
find freedmen carrying on the same kind of business after their manumission as they had been running
while still slaves. See, for example, Dig. 37.14.18 (Scaevola, libro quarto responsorum): 'quaero, an
libertus prohiberi potest a patrono in eadem colonia, in qua ipse negotiatur, idem genus negotii
exercere. Scaevola respondit non posse prohiberi'.
41
 Cp. Rostovtzeff, op.cit. (n. 16), 99 and 176-177.
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with a fixed income, whereas the advancement of a peculium to an
enterprising slave gave him a profit easily exceeding the interest rate. There
were, however, some setbacks bringing us back to Callistus's case.
Callistus's case
As we have seen, the acquisitions of a slave cum peculio were not treated äs
belonging to his master, but to the slave, or rather to his peculium. They
belonged, as it were, to the 'equitable estate' of the slave. Consequently,
acquisitions of a slave cum peculio did not enrich the master as a matter of
course. To hold differently would have been 'aperte falsum' according to
Tryphoninus.42 So a genuine versio in rem domini was required in order to
enrich the estate of the master. If this had occurred, the master's estate was
enriched. As a consequence, he was not allowed to hide behind the peculium
of his slave and his liability was extended to the amount of his enrichment.
This is what Callistus was given to understand by the imperial Chancery.
Still, the master's liability was not füll (in solidum) liability, for the master
of a slave cum peculio was only liable on condition and to the extent of his
enrichment.
As has been observed above, in solidum liability for the acts of a
slave was based on the master's explicit authority {iussum). There
was no doctrine of apparent authority, but for two instances: the case
of a slave acting as business manager (institor) on behalf of his
master and the slave acting as captain (exercitor) on one of his
master's ships. The former were shopkeepers or little business-men
in charge of a shop or a business not belonging to their peculium, but
to the master's own estate. If the owners put slaves in charge to run
them on their behalf, they were holding them out äs acting on
ostensible authority and were consequently held liable for all
contracts concluded in the course of that particular business. The
problem was what should be held whenever an institor was acting
ultra vires. Normally the master could not be held accountable as the
slave acted without his authority. There were, however,
circumstances allowing for an imputation of ultra vires contracts. A
nDig 1536
43
 On the actwnes mstitoriae and exemtoriae see Käser, op cit (n 11) I, 605 ff The impenal
Chancery advised Callistus that, apart from a iussum to that end, in solidum liability of the master
could only be had if Callistus had contracted with an institor, addmg explicitly 'ex causa cui
praepositus fuit' See infra n 48
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famous example, even among historians , is the case of the runaway
slave reported by Paul in the first book of his Decreta.45 His master
had put him in charge of an enterprise in the money-lending
business. As it happened, the slave turned to other forms of fïnancial
services as well, in the course of which hè incurred liabilities. One
day the slave absconded (taking all the cash with him) and his master
was held liable for his slave's ultra vires contracts. On appeal from
the praefectus annonae, the lawyers in the imperial consilium held
mat the master was not liable, as there was no authority to engage in
other contracts than providing loans on security. Severus, however,
decided differently. He upheld the sentence of the praefectus
annonae by holding the master liable for all the debts incurred by his
slave. Clearly, because the master was estopped to plead want of
authority on the part of his slave by allowing him to go on with his
illicit practices for a considerable time. The emperor (himself a law-
yer) must have thought that this was a case of ostensible authority if
ever there was one. This is a case involving a slave without a
peculium, but acting as his master's institor, for whom the master
takes füll responsibility; hè had been given money ad negotiandum,
not by way of a peculium. Had the master granted a peculium, hè
would not have been held fully (in solidum) liable for the debts
incurred by his slave.
Even in antiquity, the relation of the actio de in rem verso to the actio de
peculio was the subject of some controversy as thepraetor proposed them in
one provision of his Edict.46 Julianus, however, emphasised that an actio de
in rem verso could still be brought on account of any enrichment exceeding
the amount of the peculium even after the actio de peculio had been brought
successfully.47 The imperial Chancery seems to have elaborated on this in
Callistus's case.48 However, assessing enrichment surpassing the amount of
the peculium implied a difficult bürden of proof as is exemplified by the
subtle decisions on the question as to what amounted to a versio in rem
44
 See, e g., F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London 1992, 2"d ed.), 238.
45
 Dig. 14.5.8.
46
 Gaius 4. 74a: 'eadem formula et de peculio et de in rem verso agitur'.
47
 Dig 153.1 2(Ulpianus).
48
 CJ. 4.25.2 (Imp. Alexander A. Callisto): 'Ex contractibus servorum quamvis de peculio dumtaxat
domini teneantur, de eo tarnen, quod in rem eorum versum est vel cum institore ex causa cui
praepositus fiiit contractum est, in solidum conveniri posse dubium non est'. PP. iii k. mai. Alexandra
A. cons. (A.D. 222)
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domini and what not. It was, for example, held that an outright gift by a slave
cum peculio from his peculium into the estate of his master was not a versio
in rem domini.49 It was, however, if a slave cum peculio had borrowed
money in order to pay a debt of his master without expecting to be
reimbursed by him. Another example concerns the prize of freedom. The
money paid to the master by the slave on account of his manumission was
not regarded as an enrichment of the master. ' If, however, the slave had lent
money from a third party and paid it to his master in order to procure his
freedom, the master was enriched and could be sued de in rem verso by that
third party if the slave was worth less than the prize that was paid to the
master.52 We may leave the casuistry aside, as it suffices to observe that
there was one overriding principle deciding them all: 'melior condicio nostra
per servos fieri potest, deterior fieri non potest' ,53
Conclusion
Slaves carrying on business as grantees of a peculium were the Roman
equivalent of modern companies, certainly so when it is realised that a slave
cum peculio could be owned by a group of investors.54 The slave was not
responsible for his acts, his master was under a limited liability and there
were strong commercial and speculative motives behind the creation of a
peculium, as can be shown by what happened on the slave's manumission. It
was then that the master (or masters) capitalised on his (or their) investment;
accounts had to be settled and there had to be decided what the slave could
keep and what not. The legal title to all the elements of the peculium that the
slave was to keep had to be transferred to him on his manumission; a mere
letter of intent to that purpose has been held insufficient.55 Of course, there
49
 Dig 1537 pr (Ulpiamis, libro vicensimo nono ad edictum) 'si donavent servus domino rem
peculiarem, actio de m rem verso cessabit'
50
 Dig 1 5 3 7 1 (Ulpianus) 'si mutuum servus accepent et donandi animo solvit, dum non vult eum
debitorem facere peculiarem, de in rem verso actio est' See on the difficulties ansmg here G Mandry,
Das gemeine Familienguterrecht II (Tübingen 1876), 500 ff and Buckland, op cit (n 31), 180
51
 Dig 1532(Iavolenus)
52
 Dig 1533pr (Ulpianus)
53
 Dig 50 17 133 (Gams, hbro octavo ad edictum provinciale)
54
 Co-ownership of slaves cum peculio caused numerous notonously difficult questions, especially in
as far as their manumission was concerned The iaw on this matter was reformed by Justiman m C J
7 7 {De servo cotnmum manumissó}
55
 On the exigency of a formal transfer of title to the hbertmus see the mterestmg case reported by
Scaevola in Dig 39 535 pr, where a former slave lost a considerable share in the debts that were
owed to his former peculium on account of the fact that his former master (a well-meamng slob) had
neglected to transfer them formally The master's letter of intent was held to be insufficient to vest the
interest in the hbertmus
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was not only a prize for the grant of freedom, but also for the surrender of
the peculium. In many cases, this was the end of the master's financial
involvement in the enterprises of his slaves cum peculio. The arrangement,
allowing for a limited liability of what was in fact the sleeping partner in the
enterprise and the total exclusion of all liability on the part of the director
(the slave), had come to an end. Of course, enterprising freedmen applied the
same device in employing the commercial capabilities of their own slaves,
more often than not former vicarii. So, to sum up a long story in a few
words, there were indeed devices in Roman law answering to the same needs
as modern Company law tries to meet in another society at another time. It
was not the Institution of slavery as such that served the purpose, but a very
'peculiar' device allowing a slave to participate in commercial activities as if
hè were a freeman. A part of his master's estate was, as it were,
'incorporated' in the slave's peculium. Notions of humctnitas had very little
to do with this. On the contrary: it was a bellissima machinatio originating
from the hard and cynical legal minds of the likes of Cato, who perceived
that the prospect of liberty by industry is one of the strengest incentives of
human ingenuity and resourcefulness.
Leiden, September 2001
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 It was not unusual that the master stipulated for a share in the future profits of his freedman's
enterprises as his partner (soaus).
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